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Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring 
information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to overcome 
these costs and stimulate information gathering. It is further assumed that increasing the 
number of actors engaged in acquiring information creates free-rider problems. 
Policymakers also value for jurisdictional and reputational reasons, so that they may 
compete for information without incentives to do so. In 2007, the U.S. House of 
Representatives created a select committee to address energy and environment issues, but 
did not give that committee legislative authority. The new committee could not compete 
with others for the ability to write or amend legislation, so its presence should not have 
changed the standing committee’s information gathering patterns. In fact, committees did 
alter their hearing patterns in response to the select committee’s work. Information has 
jurisdictional and reputational value to policymakers in addition to the incentives it can 
help them obtain, and policymakers will act to acquire information even without explicit 
incentives to do so. 
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Policymakers rely heavily on information for multiple purposes. Information may 
highlight public problems, reduce any uncertainty about the likely effects of different 
policy proposals, help make binary voting decisions and provide signals to others about 
one's competence and expertise. In order to understand how and why policymakers use 
information, it is important to understand how and why they acquire information. 
Incentives are often thought to drive information acquisition patterns; it is commonly 
assumed that policymakers must be given the opportunity to shape outcomes in order for 
them to incur information costs (Bawn 1996; Gailmard 2009; Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1987; 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Patty 2009). When multiple actors are charged with 
gathering information about the same issue, their competition for the available incentives 
benefits the institution in which they serve. Other scholars emphasize the jurisdictional 
and reputational benefits to acquiring information (Aberbach 1990; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; King 1997; Sheingate 2006; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995).  
 This paper examines information gathering in the congressional committee 
system. Committees are critical to legislatures’ information flows by serving as a division 
of labor that facilitates learning about multiple, complex issues simultaneously. 
Committees are thought to compete primarily for the ability to translate their information 
into legislation, but information is valuable to committees for other reasons; acquiring 
information can help a committee define issues favorably to create jurisdictional benefits 
and new lines of authority, gain access to additional information, and build a positive 
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reputation within the institution. The case of the House Select Energy Independence and 
Global Warming Committee from 2007 shows that congressional committees compete 
for information even without being provided with legislative incentives. The Select 
Committee was created to elevate attention to energy and environmental issues, but 
House leaders did not provide the new panel with incentives that are considered 
important for stimulating committee information gathering. The Select Committee could 
not report its own bills or amend other committees' legislation, so it did not compete with 
standing committees for floor space or agenda control. Yet, the Select Committee's 
information patterns still altered how several standing committees prioritized energy and 
environment issues. 
 The article proceeds in six sections. The first section discusses the role of 
incentives in legislative information patterns, as well as the other benefits that 
committees derive from acquiring information. The second section describes the 2007 
creation of the House Select Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee. This 
committee was not given legislative authority, so it did not compete for traditional 
incentives for translating its information into policy. The third section describes the 
House data used to analyze changes in committee information patterns. The fourth 
section shows how the Select Committee altered standing committees’ information 
acquisition patterns on energy and environment issues without competing for legislative 
incentives. The fifth section discusses alternative explanations for the 2007 changes to 
standing committee information patterns. The sixth section concludes. 
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2. Incentives and Information in Congress 
Congress is charged with solving public problems (Parker and Davidson 1979). In order 
to address the array of problems on the governmental agenda, the institution thus needs 
information to monitor the environment, develop legislation, and oversee federal 
programs (Bimber 1996; Hammond 1986; Krehbiel 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1994; 
Rich 2004; Weiss 1989). Acquiring information requires time, attention, and other 
resources. Not only do these activities incur costs themselves, but a decision-maker’s 
time and attention are limited; using resources to gather information about one issue 
means that others must be ignored (Jones 2001), creating opportunity costs. Congress 
occasionally delegates information gathering to federal bureaucrats (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1994; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Huber and Shipan 2002; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1994; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; McCubbins and Page 1986) and 
to interest groups (Esterling 2004; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), but congressional 
committees remain the primary information processing venue within the institution. 
The committee system encourages specialization, allowing Congress to learn 
about multiple issues simultaneously (Asher 1974; Cooper 1970; Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1987, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1994). Committees often receive 
incentives such as control over floor debate (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; 1990; Krehbiel 
1991) and a chance to dominate conference negotiations (Bawn 1996) to help offset their 
information costs and encourage information gathering and transmission. Committee 
jurisdictions often overlap, so they often gather information on similar issues 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; King 1997; Sheingate 2006). Doing so is 
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thought to produce competition for the legislative incentives (Bawn 1996). Overlap and 
competition benefit the institution by ensuring that more information is produced 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1986), increasing political control (Niskanen 1979), and creating 
redundancies that protect against system breakdowns (Landau 1969). Studies of 
information costs and incentives emphasize competition for the legislative incentives 
while often excluding consideration of information’s other benefits. The ability to 
translate one's information into policy through legislation is considered to be the most 
important incentive; indeed, information is believed to be unimportant without that ability 
(Patty 2009). Congressional committees are not expected to gather or transmit any 
information absent legislative incentives. 
Information can serve multiple purposes, and it can be important for committees 
to acquire even if it is not immediately translated into outcomes. Congressional 
committees use information to strategically define problems and manage the subsystem 
environment (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Seeking out and acquiring information 
prompts new sources to emerge that help committees identify further problems that need 
to be addressed (Aberbach 1990). Increasing the amount and variety of information a 
committee exposes itself to at one point in time may allow that committee to shift the 
boundaries of policymaking authority and worth as a future policy venue (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; King 1997; Sheingate 2006; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995). 
Committees also are critical to legislative information flows, and members of Congress 
often take decision cues from colleagues on committees with jurisdiction over the issue in 
question (Bianco 1997; Kingdon 1973; Porter 1974; Sabatier and Whiteman 1995), so 
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acquiring information about federal programs helps increase the value of a member’s 
committee assignments and reduce the chance that a member is perceived as 
unknowledgeable (Aberbach 1990). 
Members of Congress face information-rich environments (Entin 1973). In the 
1970s, Congress responded to the executive branch's informational advantage on many 
issues by re-organizing its committees, increasing member staff and creating or adapting 
several information agencies including the General Accounting Office and the Office of 
Technology Assessment. Overlap and entropy among committee jurisdictions increase 
the supply of information and the strategic opportunities available to legislators 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Sheingate 2006; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 
2009), and the successful committee changes Congress adopted in the 1970s improved 
information sharing and coordination (Adler and Wilkerson 2008). However, adding 
additional committees is thought to create collective action problems and lead to shirking 
(Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001), particularly when the additional committee is 
charged only with oversight – standing committees are expected to free-ride on the 
special committee’s information (Gailmard 2009). Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi 
(D-Calif.) undertook just such an exercise in 2007, creating a new Select Energy 
Independence and Global Warming Committee without giving it the ability to report its 
own legislation or amend other committees' bills. The next section describes the 
committee's creation. 
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3. Creating the Select Committee 
During the 2006 congressional election campaign, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
(D-Calif.) and other congressional Democrats sought to create a contrast with President 
George W. Bush and the House Republican majority with a “Six for '06” agenda, which 
included energy issues, reducing federal student loan interest rates, and increasing the 
minimum wage. House Democrats successfully achieved majority party status through 
those elections and used the 110
th
 Congress's first week to vote on an energy efficiency 
bill and other “Six for ‘06” legislation. As the new Speaker of the House, Pelosi also 
stated her intention to create a new committee to highlight global warming and energy 
issues, and announced the chamber would take up climate change legislation by July 4 of 
that year. Her directives caused consternation among senior Democrats, particularly 
House Energy and Commerce Committee chair John Dingell (D-Mich.), who had served 
as that panel's senior Democrat for four decades (either as chair or ranking member) and 
who often worked to protect the auto manufacturers that comprise part of his 
constituency (Mufson 2007; Eilperin and Grunwald 2007). 
 Pelosi was not the first congressional leader to create a special committee for 
addressing a salient public problem; homeland security, intelligence, Indian affairs, and 
aging are all issues for which Congress created a select committee before making those 
committees standing or permanent. Other special committees addressing international 
events or investigating the executive branch have existed for short periods of time. Pelosi 
compromised with Dingell and other committee leaders by agreeing that the new Select 
Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee would not have legislative 
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authority. According to H Res 202, 110
th
 Congress (which officially established the 
committee), the Select Committee only had authority to investigate and recommend 
policies and strategies for reducing U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Pelosi tapped Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), the Energy 
and Commerce Committee’s third-ranking Democrat, to chair the new panel, while Rep. 
Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the Science and Technology Committee's ranking member, 
served in the same capacity on the Select Committee. 
The Select Committee could not directly translate its information into legislation, 
meaning it was not provided with what is considered the primary incentive for 
congressional committees to gather information, nor were other committees competing 
with the new panel for that incentive. In this situation, standing committees should be 
expected to let the Select Committee incur information costs on certain energy and 
environment issues without changing their own patterns. Rather than engage in free-
riding, however, several standing committees reacted to the Select Committee's 
information patterns by seeking out similar information on their own. The next section 
outlines the data used to show that the Select Committee was able to successfully alter 





4. Data and Methods 
The Select Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee was not authorized to 
markup and report legislation, so its activity consisted entirely of hearings. Any effect on 
the standing committees' information patterns is therefore most likely found in the 
hearing process. Committee hearings highlight important issues, help focus member and 
staff time and attention and send signals to other political actors about what issues and 
policy dimensions are salient and how they should be defined (Aberbach 1990; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Diermeier and Fedderson 2000; Fisher 1983; Ogul 1976). 
Individual committees vary in their attention to particular issues and susceptibility to new 
signals and issue intrusion (May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2009), so the Select 
Committee's effects are likely seen at the individual committee level rather than in the 
aggregate. 
I have argued that committees have multiple reasons to acquire information in 
addition to whatever legislative incentives are provided. Information can help committees 
learn about new problems and clarify or redefine old ones, establish or strengthen their 
jurisdictions and authority over particular policy domains, and establish or strengthen 
their reputations within the institution (Aberbach 1990; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
King 1997; Sheingate 2006; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995). These additional 
uses mean that information should remain important to committees even absent the 
competition for legislative incentives. These competing expectations can be expressed as 
the following simple hypotheses: 
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Free-Riding Hypothesis: All standing committees will have decreased or 
kept constant their 2001 – 2006 levels of information gathering on energy 
and environment issues in 2007, except on issues that would be translated 
into legislation. 
 
Multiple Benefits Hypothesis: Standing committees will have increased 
their 2001 – 2006 levels of information gathering on energy and 
environment issues in 2007, in response to the Select Committee’s 
information patterns. 
 
I test these hypotheses using congressional hearings data from 2001 – 2007. The 
Select Committee was charged with gathering information on energy and the 
environment, so a baseline of congressional hearings on those issues is needed in order to 
test whether the Select Committee’s information acquisition patterns affected the 
standing committees in 2007. I calculated the levels of committee attention to energy and 
environment issues using to the Policy Agendas Project's Congressional Hearings dataset 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2002). Measuring committee information patterns as 
a proportion controls for yearly fluctuations in overall hearing activity. Table 1 lists each 
committee that held a hearing on energy or the environment from 2001 to 2007, with the 
proportion of their hearings devoted to those issues and the total number of hearings each 








Table 1. U.S. House Committee Attention to Energy and Environment Issues, 2001 – 
2007. 
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0 (45) 0 (34) 0 (39) 
0.019 
(52) 





“Energy” and “environment” are both broad policy areas with multiple 
dimensions, so these hearing patterns can be examined even more closely. The House 
floor took up HR 3221, the New Direction for Energy Independence, National Security, 
and Consumer Protection Act, in August following Speaker Pelosi’s request for energy 
legislation. In order to compare the Select Committee’s information pattern with this 
major energy and environment bill, I each of the Select Committee’s 2007 hearings and 
each of HR 3221’s titles according to the Policy Agendas Project’s topic coding scheme.1 
Codes for HR 3221 titles that correspond to other bills introduced in the 110th Congress 
were taken from the Congressional Bills Project dataset (Adler and Wilkerson 2007). 
Eleven of the Select Committee's 22 hearings in 2007 focused on the environment, with 
nine hearings devoted to energy policy. 2 Of the 11 environment policy hearings, nine 
dealt with global warming and air pollution issues. By contrast, two-thirds of HR 3221’s 
nine titles concerned energy issues, with none addressing environment policy outright. 
The other three titles focused on labor and employment, small business issues, and 
transportation. Half of the bill’s energy titles addressed alternative and renewable energy, 
meaning that issue was the subject of more titles than any other. 
As Table 1 shows, only six committees held hearings on energy or environment 
issues every year in this period – Agriculture, Energy and Commerce, Government 
Oversight, Natural Resources, Science and Technology, and Transportation. I include 
only these six “high-attention” committees in examining whether information patterns on 
narrower policy dimensions changed in 2007. In order to measure changes in committee 
information patterns, I calculated the difference between each committee’s 2007 
                                                 
1 HR 3221 was later amended by the Senate and became the legislative vehicle for the Democrats' 
economic stimulus legislation; the titles coded here refer to the bill originally brought to the House floor, 
when energy and the environment were still the bill's main foci. 
2 The other two hearings were devoted to agriculture issues and public lands 
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proportion of attention to the relevant policy issue and its average proportion from 2001 – 
2006. Table 2 lists each of these committees’ average proportion of hearings for each 
dimension from 2001 – 2006 along their 2007 proportion, with the total number of 
hearings in parentheses. 
 




Hearings Devoted to the 
Environment 
 Environment Hearings 
Devoted to Global 
Warming 
 Energy Hearings 
Devoted to Renewable 
Energy 
Committee 2001 – 
2006 Avg. 






 2001 – 
2006 Avg. 






 2001 – 
2006 Avg. 






Agriculture 0.739 (16) 0.500 (2)  0 (11) 0 (1)  0.75 (5) 1.0 (1) 
Energy & 
Commerce 0.490 (79) 0.636 (11) 
 
0.293 (37) 0.571 (7) 
 
0.100 (43) 0.25 (4) 
Government 
Operations 0.355 (57) 0.857 (7) 
 
0.042 (21) 0.500 (6) 
 
0.015 (36) 0 (1) 
Natural 
Resources 0.727 (119) 0.75 (20) 
 
0 (85) 0.067 (15) 
 
0.103 (34) 0.400 (5) 
Science & 
Technology 0.398 (56) 0.526 (19) 
 
0.307 (23) 0.300 (10) 
 
0.186 (33) 0.222 (9) 
Transportation 0.875 (47) 0.75 (12)  0 (42) 0.222 (9)  0.200 (5) 0 (3) 
 
The next section examines whether standing committees chose to free-ride on the Select 





The Select Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee was not given 
the authority to write or amend legislation, meaning the committee could not translate 
whatever information it acquired into legislation. The committee also could not compete 
with others over receiving restrictive rules, control over floor debate, or claim to any 
potential conference committee appointments.  Competition for these sorts of legislative 
incentives is thought to drive committee information gathering (Bawn 1996; Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1987, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Patty 2009). Moreover, adding a new committee 
without legislative authority is believed to create free-riding (Gailmard 2009). In addition 
to creating a new committee, Speaker Pelosi asked the committees to produce energy 
legislation, so any change in standing committee information patterns in 2007 should 
result from their competition over influencing the House’s legislative output and not 
reactions to the Select Committee’s information patterns. Figure 1 shows the differences 
in 2007 House committee information gathering on energy and environment issues and 









Figure 1. Changes in Overall Energy and Environment Information Acquisition Patterns. 
 
 15 
Figure 1 reveals that nine of the 15 committees acquired relatively more 
information on energy and environment issues in 2007 than they did on average from 
2001 – 2006. It is important to note that the House Budget Committee received only two 
energy and environment bills to the House Budget Committee from 2005 – 2006, while 
the Judiciary Committee received four (Adler and Wilkerson 2005; 2006). Both of these 
committees acquired more information on energy and environment issues in 2007 despite 
a general lack of involvement in those policy areas, and HR 3221, the major energy and 
environment legislation introduced in 2007, was not referred to either committee. The 
House Budget and Judiciary Committees, then, increased their attention to energy and 
environment issues in 2007 even without legislative incentives to do so on their own, let 
alone incentives for which to compete with the Select Committee.  
 Figure 1 covers changes in overall attention to energy and environment issues 
among individual House committees in 2007. These issues carry multiple attributes, so 
committees may have acquired information about different dimensions than did the 
Select Committee. Traditional theorizing about when and how information will be 
gathered suggests that committees will only compete for information that will be directly 
translated into policy. The House Energy and Commerce Committee began hearings on 
HR 3221 in April and the bill was formally introduced in July, so if standing committees 
competed for the ability to translate their information into legislation, they should have 
shifted their attention to the policy dimensions that were later included in HR 3221 
(specifically alternative energy). If committees value information for jurisdictional and 
reputational reasons in addition to the legislative incentives it brings, the standing 
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committees’ shifts should have acquired information on issues similar to the Select 
Committee (namely global warming). 
None of HR 3221’s nine titles specifically addressed environment policy, while a 
plurality of the Select Committee’s 2007 hearings focused on that issue. If committees 
only gather information that will be translated into legislation, then committees should 
have reduced or held constant the level of information they acquired on the  environment 
relative to energy policy in 2007 than they had on average from 2001 – 2006. If the 
standing committees took their cue from the Select Committee and worked to maintain or 
expand their jurisdictions and reputations, then they should have acquired more 
information about the environment relative to energy. To test this proposition I calculated 
the average proportions of energy-environment hearings devoted to the environment for 
all committees that held at least one hearing on energy or the environment every year 
from 2001 – 2006, the Natural Resources, Science and Technology, Energy and 
Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Government Reform 
Committees, along with their 2007 proportions of energy-environment hearings devoted 
to environment policy. Figure 2 displays the differences between these committees 2007 







Figure 2. Changes in Information Gathering on Environment Issues Relative to Energy. 
 
According to Figure 2, the Government Operations, Energy and Commerce, 
Science and Technology, and Natural Resources Committees all increased the amount of 
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information they gathered on environment policy relative to energy in 2007, even though 
none of HR 3221’s titles directly addressed this policy area. In fact, only two committees, 
Agriculture and Transportation, focused more on gathering information about energy 
policy relative to the environment even though two-thirds of HR 3221’s titles concerned 
energy policy. Figure 2 thus presents additional evidence that committees compete for 
information even without translating that information into legislation. Committees 
acquire information because it can enhance their jurisdictional and institutional authority 
in addition to being provided with incentives to help offset their costs. 
“Energy” and “Environment” are still broad policy areas with multiple 
dimensions, so these data can be examined even further. 82 percent of the Select 
Committee’s environment-focused hearings (nine out of 11) were devoted to the global 
warming and air pollution dimension. The other two hearings cut across multiple 
environment policy subtopics, which are given a separate code. Because none of HR 
3221’s titles addressed environment policy, it follows that none directly addressed global 
warming, either. The standing committees that acquired relatively more information on 
environment issues in 2007 may have chosen to free-ride on the Select Committee’s 
global warming information pattern and focus their attention on other policy dimensions, 
in which case committees should be expected to have held constant or decreased their 
pattern of acquiring information about global warming and air pollution in 2007. Figure 3 
displays the differences between each high-attention committee’s 2007 proportion of 
environment hearings devoted to global warming and its 2001 – 2006 average. 
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Figure 3. Changes in Information Gathering on the Global Warming Dimension of 
Environment Policy. 
 
Figure 3 shows that four of the six high-attention committees increased the 
amount of environment policy information they gathered specifically concerning global 
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warming and air pollution dimension in 2007. The Government Operations, Energy and 
Commerce, Transportation, and Natural Resources Committees all held relative more 
environment hearings on global warming in 2007 than they had on average in the 
preceding six-year period. Neither the Natural Resources nor Transportation Committee 
held any global warming-related hearings from 2001 to 2006, so their 2007 information 
pattern truly represented attempts to gain new information even absent a legislative 
incentive to do so. Additionally, Figures 2 and 3 show that the Government Operations 
Committee’s pattern of acquiring environment information relative to energy policy and 
its acquisition of global warming information when focusing on the environment each 
showed the largest increase among high-attention committees in 2007. Similar results can 
be found for the Energy and Commerce Committee, which displayed the second-largest 
increase for each of these measures. The results so far make plain that the House 
Government Operations and Energy and Commerce Committees began strongly 
competing with the Select Committee for information about global warming issues in 
2007 even though they were not competing for incentives to translate that information 
into legislation.  
As with the environment, energy policy is multidimensional. Not only were two-
thirds of HR 3221’s titles devoted to energy issues, but fully half of those six titles 
concentrated on alternative and renewable energy.3 If committees only gather information 
when they are given incentives to translate that information into legislation, then standing 
                                                 
3 The others: Titles VI and IX addressed energy conservation, while Title VII concerned natural gas and 
oil. 
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committees should have focused their energy-related information gathering on the 
renewable energy dimension. Figure 4 displays the differences between each high-
attention committee’s 2007 proportion of energy hearings devoted to alternative and 
renewable energy and its 2001 – 2006 average. 




According to the results shown in Figure 4, four of the six high-attention 
committees – Natural Resources, Agriculture, Energy and Commerce, and Science and 
Technology, gathered more information on renewable energy than they had on average 
from 2001 – 2006, consistent with the notion that committees will compete for certain 
information in the face of legislative incentives to do so. These standing committees 
acquired more information on alternative and renewable energy relative to other energy 
issues in 2007, and more of HR 3221’s titles concerned that issue than any other policy 
dimension. Interestingly, the Transportation Committees held relatively fewer hearings 
on renewable energy than its previous six-year average, suggesting that free-riding can 
occur even in the presence of legislative incentives. Taken in conjunction with the 
previous results, Figure 4 re-emphasizes that committees do not acquire information for 










6. Alternative Explanations 
 The evidence presented thus far shows that congressional committees acquired 
information for its ability to enhance their jurisdictional authority and institutional 
reputation, learn about and define emerging problems and solutions, satisfy policy 
interest and because they are provided with incentives to do so. I have argued that the 
Select Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee’s information acquisition 
pattern stimulated other committees to gather similar kinds of information even through 
the Select Committee was not competing for legislative incentives. Nevertheless, four 
alternative explanations may be posited for the standing committee information pattern 
changes observed above. Public pressure, partisanship, ideology, or committee members’ 
dominant goals all may have produced the shifts in committee information gathering 
rather than the Select Committee’s influence. This section will address each of these 
explanations in turn. 
The first alternative explanation is that committees gathered more information on 
issues the public thought needed addressing and engage in problem solving (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012). Changes to a committee’s environment (such as the level of public 
concern) can affect its oversight patterns (Aberbach 1990). Certain committees thus may 
have responded to public pressure by holding more hearings on energy and environment 
issues. The Policy Agendas Project’s Most Important Problem (MIP) dataset contains the 
proportion of Gallup survey respondents who list a particular issue as the “most 
important problem facing the nation” from 1946 to 2011. If committees responded to 
public pressure, then higher percentages of respondents should have called energy or the 
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environment the most important problem (or an increase for both issues) in 2006 or 2007. 
Figure 5 shows the MIP percentages for energy and the environment from 2001 – 2007. 




Figure 5 shows that a higher percentage of respondents cited energy as the most 
important problem facing the country in 2006, so it may be the case that the increased 
committee activity on energy issues in 2007 was a response to this environmental change, 
either directly or because Speaker Pelosi responded to the increased public concern by 




































which to compete. However, the public pressure explanation cannot account for why 
several committees acquired more information on environment issues, even at the 
expense of energy policy information, when there was no significant increase in Gallup 
respondents prioritizing environment policy. Figure 5 shows a gradual increase in the 
percentage of respondents prioritizing environment policy in 2006 and 2007, but that 
percentage remained lower than its 2001 level. According to Figure 2, four high-attention 
committees acquired more information on environment policy relative to energy in 2007, 
but such a change seems to be contra contemporary changes in public opinion. 
The second alternative explanation is that a House majority party switch caused 
shifts in committee hearing patterns. The Democratic Party, who took control of the 
House in 2007, is more closely identified with environmental issues in the electorate 
(Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, et al. 2003), and so a partisan explanation would find the 
increased amount of information acquired on environment issues exhibited by several 
committees only natural. This argument cannot explain, however, why the shifts in 
committee attention shown above did not occur in all committees. If Democrats are more 
engaged in environment policy, then all committees should have worked to acquire more 
information on those issues. However, the Agriculture and Transportation increased the 
amount of energy information they received relative to environment policy. It also should 
be noted that the House’s major legislation in this area concerned energy, and did not 
directly address environment policy. Even if the Democrat’s “ownership” of environment 
policy interacted with the competition for legislative incentives within the House to 
produce the patterns found here, this does not alter the conclusion that the combination of 
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member interest and incentives accounts for the information pattern shifts found above, 
rather than one or the other. The ideological and member-goal explanations will be 
addressed in tandem. 
“Preference outliers” may be more apt to free-ride, since their information is more 
likely to be amended and thus they are less likely to have their information costs offset 
with restrictive rules. As Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond (2001, 251) point out, 
“[b]ecause such an agent will be ignored, it is pointless for him to pay the information-
gathering cost.” At the same time, ideologues to adapt more slowly (Denrell and March 
2001), so we might expect those committees chaired by ideologically extreme members 
to display delayed response to the Select Committee’s information pattern and continue 
gathering similar information of their own. Alternately, more liberal committee chairs 
might have been more apt to focus on environment issues. Further, Sinclair (1986) adapts 
Fenno’s typology of member goals (1973) to build hypotheses about committee 
information acquisition. She specifically suggests that committees with members 
interested in serving their constituencies have no incentive to seek out information on 
their own, while members predominantly interested in policy have an innate interest in 
searching out new issues, which their committees’ information acquisition patterns 
should reflect.   
To examine the ideological and member goal propositions, I have calculated 
Pearson correlations between each committee chair’s ideology and each committee’s 
“goal-type” and whether a committee decided to free-ride on the Select Committee’s 
information acquisition patterns. Ideology is measured with each committee chair’s DW-
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NOMINATE scores and lifetime League of Conservation scores (Bayard, et al. 2006), 
each taken from the previous congress. If moderate committee chairs are more likely to 
free-ride, then such behavior (either a constant or decreased 2007 information acquisition 
pattern) should be positively correlated with DW-NOMINATE scores (higher values 
indicate conservatism) and negatively correlated with LCV Lifetime scores (higher 
values indicate greater congruence with the League of Conservation Voters' positions). If 
liberal committee chairs are more likely to free-ride, then free-riding should be negatively 
correlated with DW-NOMINATE scores and positively correlated with LCV Lifetime 
scores. The committee goal-types are taken from Smith and Deering (1990); the House 
Homeland Security Committee, created after that work, is coded as a “constituency” 
committee due to the high number of distributive decisions committee members make 
(Coates, Karahan, and Tollison 2006). Sinclair (1986) suggests that policy committees 
will be negatively associated with free-riding, while constituency committees will be 
positively associated with free-riding. Table 3 lists each committee chair's ideologies and 
each committee’s dominant member goal, and whether that committee altered its 
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Table 4. Correlations Between Committee Characteristics and 2007 Information 
Acquisition Patterns. 
 Committee Chair 
Ideology 
Committee Goal-Type 
Committee free-riding on: DW-
NOMINATE 
LCV Score Constituency Policy 
Energy/environment hearings -0.14 -0.07 0.20 -0.56* 
Energy-environ. hearings devoted to 
environ. 
-0.02 -0.52 0.50 -0.5 
Environment hearings on global warming 0.91 -0.73 0.50 -0.5 
Energy hearings on renewable energy -0.76 0.67 -0.25 0.25 
* p < 0.05, two-tailed 
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Table 5 provides little support for the notion that ideology influenced adaptation 
to the Select Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee's hearing signals. 
None of the correlations are statistically significant. Moreover, the correlations between 
committee chair ideology and free-riding do not display a consistent direction. As 
measured by DW-NOMINATE scores, free-riding on energy-environment information, 
information about the environment relative to energy, and renewable energy within the 
energy domain is associated with more liberal committee chairs, but associated with 
moderate committee chairs for global warming within environment policy. When interest 
group ratings are used, liberal chairs also are positively associated with committee free-
riding on renewable energy information, but moderate chairs are associated with free-
riding in the other areas examined here. 
There is slightly more support for Sinclair’s (1986) hypothesis that policy-
oriented committees will be more likely to seek out new information, and therefore less 
likely to free-ride on other committees’ information patterns. Policy-oriented committees 
are negatively associated with free-riding on others’ overall increased information 
gathering on energy and environment issues. However, as with the ideology results, 
Sinclair’s hypotheses are not consistently supported. None of the other correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant, and the correlations between committee goal-type 
and free-riding on information about renewable energy suggest that policy-oriented 
committees were positively associated with free-riding, while constituency committees 




 Congress uses political and analytic information for a variety of purposes. 
Prioritizing and gathering this information requires time, attention, and other resources, 
so it has been theorized that principals provide incentives to agents who then compete to 
keep the principals properly informed. In Congress these incentives typically take the 
form of policy discretion – the ability to write legislation and prevent others from altering 
it. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi created a new Select Energy Independence and Global 
Warming Committee in 2007, but the committee could not propose or markup legislation. 
It was thus ineligible for legislative incentives such as restrictive rules, control over floor 
debate, and conference committee appointments, neither could it compete with standing 
committees for these incentives. 
Information is believed to be unimportant unless it can be translated directly into 
policy (Patty 2009), but the data examined here indicate that congressional committees 
seek out information even without legislative incentives to do so. Contrary to 
expectations that creating committees without legislative authority creates collective 
action problems (Gailmard 2009), few  committees were content to free-ride on the Select 
Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee’s information gathering, and 
instead held hearings of their own on global warming and energy and environment issues 
generally. Two committees (Judiciary and Foreign Affairs) increased their attention to 
these issues even though they have been and remain uninvolved in crafting energy or 
environment-related legislation. Still other committees acquired new information on 
issues that were not significant parts of the pending New Direction for Energy 
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Independence, National Security, and Consumer Protection Act (HR 3221). Legislative 
incentives remain an important means of stimulating information gathering; however a 
full account of information’s value to policymakers recognizes that committees also 
acquire information for jurisdictional and reputational reasons. 
 These results suggest future directions for studying information's role in policy 
making. House Republicans let the Select Committee's authorization expire when they 
claimed the majority in 2011. Despite his initial objections to its creation, the 
committee’s top Republican Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner came to argue that the Select 
Energy Independence and Global Warming Committee should be preserved as a valuable 
oversight tool (Reilly 2007; Sensenbrenner 2010). In light of this paper’s findings and 
Rep. Sensenbrenner’s willingness to serve as chair of a committee without any legislative 
authority, more work could be done to explore how information enhances a committee's 
reputation. Committees’ prominence in legislative information flows suggests that 
specialists perceive costs to “not knowing” about their area of expertise (Aberbach 1990). 
As informal groups have risen in Congress to provide members with additional means of 
collecting and receiving information (Stevens, Mulhollan and Hammond 1987), an 
important question remains of how committees have reacted to these threats to their 
privileged status as information processing units. 
Committees vary in their individual susceptibility to new informational signals (May, 
Sapotichne, and Workman 2009). Indeed, the only alternative hypothesis that received 
even minimal support is that policy-oriented committees are sometimes more likely to 
seek out their own information and thus less likely to free-ride on others’ work, however 
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this hypothesis was not consistently supported by the data presented here. Sheingate 
(2006) finds that jurisdictional proximity affects a committee’s likelihood of taking up 
new issues; at the same time, this study finds that several committees with jurisdictions 
only tangentially related to energy and the environment increased their hearing activity 
on those issues, suggesting that committees with “slack” in their issue attention can more 
readily take on additional information. Future research could more closely examine the 
individual factors that affect committee information acquisition patterns in order to more 
precisely determine when legislative incentives are needed to overcome information costs 
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